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Abstract:	 Malware	 is	 a	 pervasive	 problem	 in	 both	 personal	 computing	 devices	 and	 distributed	 computing	
systems.	Identification	of	malware	variants	and	their	families	offers	a	great	benefit	in	early	detection	resulting	
in	a	reduction	of	the	analyses	time	needed.	In	order	to	classify	malware,	most	of	the	current	approaches	are	
based	on	the	analysis	of	the	unpacked	and	unencrypted	binaries.	However,	most	of	the	unpacking	solutions	in	
the	 literature	 have	 a	 low	 unpacking	 rate.	 This	 results	 in	 a	 low	 contribution	 towards	 the	 identification	 of	
transferred	code	and	re-used	code.	To	develop	a	new	malware	analysis	 solution	based	on	clusters	of	binary	
code	sections,	 it	 is	 required	 to	 focus	on	 increasing	of	 the	unpacking	 rate	of	malware	 samples	 to	extend	 the	
underlying	 code	 database.	 In	 this	 paper,	 we	 present	 a	 new	 approach	 of	 analysing	 malware	 by	 integrating	
ETHER	 Unpacker	 into	 the	 plugin-based	 malware	 analysis	 tool,	 Ragpicker.	 We	 also	 evaluate	 our	 approach	
against	real-world	malware	patterns.		
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1.	Introduction	
	
Malware	 has	 evolved	 from	 a	 pastime	 for	 hobbyist	 programmers	 and	 hackers	 into	 a	 powerful	 and	 effective	
money	earner.	Due	to	the	increasing	prevalence	of	technology	in	our	lives,	the	opportunities	of	making	money	
by	exploiting	these	technologies'	vulnerabilities	rise	proportionately.	One	problem	is	that	malware	developers	
have	 infinite	 degrees	 of	 freedom	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 new	 piece	 of	 malware.	 Antivirus	
companies	 receive	 thousands	 of	 new	 malware	 samples	 daily.	 The	 time	 lag	 between	 the	 release	 of	 new	
malware	threats	and	the	response	from	the	security	industry	allows	the	authors	of	such	threats	sufficient	time	
to	alter	 and/or	 improve	 their	 code	 to	avoid	detection.	 This	 statement	 is	 supported	by	 the	 fact	 that	 in	2014	
almost	 one	million	 new	malware	 threats	were	 released	 every	 single	 day.	Malware	 can	 result	 in	 substantial	
costs	for	business	and	governments.	For	example,	the	Zeus	botnet	alone	is	estimated	to	have	caused	over	one	
hundred	million	USD	of	damages	between	2007-2012	 (Scanlon	and	Kechadi	 2014)	 and	malware	 attacks	 can	
cost	companies	over	$6,500	per	hour	to	rectify	(Amin,	2016).	The	desire	to	avoid	detection	coupled	with	the	
often-lucrative	nature	of	malware	development	means	that	there	is	a	high	probability	that	as	new	malware	is	
developed	it	will	likely	utilise	novel,	unknown	techniques.	The	discovery	of	these	new	techniques	is	essential	to	
effectively	defend	against	them.		
	
Traditional	malware	detection	relies	greatly	on	file	signatures,	providing	which	is	a	reactive	process	of	ending	a	
malware,	 creating	 a	 signature	 (for	 example	 by	 hashing	 or	 extracting	 byte	 sequences)	 and	 pushing	 these	
signatures	 into	 filesystem	scanners.	However,	 this	approach	seems	 to	 fail	against	new	malware	code,	which	
incorporates	 rootkit	 technologies	 and	 gets	 encoded	 to	 subvert	 anti-virus	 products.	 New	malware	 detection	
approaches	 are	 based	 on	 behaviour	 analysis	 including	 static	 analysis	 and	 dynamic	 analysis.	 Static	 analysis	
extracts	information	about	the	binary	code	without	executing	the	binary.	On	the	other	hand,	dynamic	malware	
analysis	 (DMA)	 extracts	 information	 about	 the	 code	 by	 observing	 what	 it	 does	 whilst	 it	 is	 running.	 These	
observations	 may	 include	 network	 communications	 (Scanlon	 and	 Kechadi,	 2014),	 file	 and	 registry	 access	
(Sikorski	 and	Honig,	 2012)	 as	well	 as	modification,	 interaction	with	 services	 and	other	behavioural	 activities	
(Wagener	and	Dulaunoy,	2008).	Recently,	a	LE	agency	has	developed	an	in-house	malware	analysis	tool	based	
on	 this	 DMA	 approach.	 However,	 this	 tool	 is	 based	 on	 ClamAV,	 a	 signature	 based	 unpacking	 with	 a	 low	
unpacking	rate	(only	at	25%).	 In	order	to	 improve	the	performance	of	this	tool,	 in	this	paper	we	present	the	
integration	 of	 Ether	 (Dinaburg	 et	 al.,	 2008)	 generic	 unpacking	 capabilities	 into	 this	 malware	 analysis	 tool.	
Finally,	we	provide	an	evaluation	of	this	new	approach.		
	
	
	
The	rest	of	this	paper	is	structured	as	follows:	Section	2	shows	the	background	of	this	research	including	the	
dynamic	malware	analysis.	We	present	briefly	 the	Ragpicker	 tool	 in	Section	3.	We	describe	our	approach	of	
implementing	and	integrating	of	Ether	Unpacker	 in	Section	4	and	discuss	on	experiment	results	 in	Section	5.	
We	conclude	and	discuss	on	future	work	in	Section	6.	
	
2.	Dynamic	Malware	analysis	
	
Most	dynamic	malware	unpacking	tools	help	to	automate	the	unpacking	process,	try	to	create	the	unpacked	
code	or	 the	modified	code	by	unpacking	 the	stub	on	 the	 runtime	due	 to	decompression	or	decryption.	This	
section	explores	PolyUnpack	 (Royal	et	al.,	2006),	 it	 firstly	disassembles	 the	packed	 file	 to	build	a	 static	code	
model	of	 the	program.	The	program	 is	 separated	 into	 two	sections,	a	set	of	 sequences	of	code	and	a	set	of	
data.	Then	the	program	is	single-step	executed	and	the	current	instruction	is	compared	with	the	code	section	
of	 the	 model.	 The	 unpacked	 code	 is	 identified	 if	 it	 does	 not	 exist	 in	 the	 static	 model.	 Due	 to	 the	 use	 of	
disassembling	and	single	stepping,	this	approach	significantly	increases	computational	overhead.	
	
Renovo	(Kang	et	al.,	2007)	monitors	each	instruction	and	tracks	instructions	that	perform	memory	writes	and	
control	transfers.	If	it	is	a	memory	write	instruction,	the	corresponding	destination	memory	is	marked	as	dirty	
which	means	 it	 is	newly	generated.	 If	any	dirty	memory	 is	executed,	one	 layer	of	unpacking	 is	 finished.	The	
address	pointed	by	the	instruction	pointer	is	 identified	as	the	OEP.	This	approach	supports	multiple	layers	of	
unpacking.	 However,	 like	 PolyUnpack,	 Renovo	 is	 an	 instruction-level	 approach	 and	 suffers	 from	 additional	
performance	overhead.	
	
Linke	 (2016)	 proposed	 a	 machine	 learning	 based	 method	 for	 both	 static	 and	 dynamic	 malware	 analysis.	
Despite	the	authors’	method	is	efficient,	it	is	however	required	unpacked	and	unencrypted	malware	patterns.					
	
Safron	(Danny	Quist,	2007)	uses	a	modified	version	of	OllyBonE	(Stewart,	2007)	to	dispatch	information	on	the	
page-faults	and	run	Intel	PIN	(Berkowits,	2012),	an	instrumentation	tool,	to	monitor	the	flow	of	executables.	If	
there	 is	any	execution	control	 transfers	 to	dynamically	 created	or	modified	pages,	a	memory	 is	dumped	 for	
further	analysis.	It	is	noted	by	the	author	of	Safron	that	this	approach	is	slow	and	does	not	cope	with	standard	
anti-debugging	 tricks	 (Ferrie,	 2009)	 due	 to	 the	 use	 of	 PIN.	 OmniUnpack	 (Martignoni	 et	 al.,	 2007)	 tracks	
execution	at	the	page	 level.	The	termination	of	unpacking	 is	determined	only	when	the	overwritten	pages	 is	
executed	and	the	program	is	about	to	invoke	a	dangerous	system	call.	At	this	time,	a	malware	detection	tool	is	
used	 to	 check	 whether	 the	 unpacked	 file	 is	 a	 malware.	 If	 it	 is	 not,	 then	 the	 execution	 is	 resumed.	 Ether	
(Dinaburg	 et	 al.,	 2008)	 is	 a	malware	 analysis	 framework	which	 leverages	 hardware	 virtualisation	 extensions	
(specifically	Intel	VT)	to	remain	transparent	to	malicious	software.	Ether	is	a	generic	malware	analyser	with	the	
main	target	of	detecting	anti-detection	techniques.	The	main	advantages	of	Ether	can	be	listed	as	follows:	
	
1. It	 can	 detect	 self-modification	 (which	 may	 indicate	 unpacking).	 For	 binaries	 that	 are	 found	 to	 be	
possibly	self-modifying,	it	can	identify	the	code	mechanism	that	carries	out	the	unpacking	and	use	this	
to	unpack	the	binary	without	any	prior	knowledge	about	the	packing	algorithm	used.	
2. Ether's	standard	control	and	data	flow	analyses	can	be	applied	to	this	code	modification	mechanism	
to	find	(and	possibly	neutralise)	dynamic	defences,	time/logic	bombs,	etc.	
	
3.	RAGPICKER	
	
3.1	Integration	point	into	the	Analysis	Process	
	
For	the	purposes	of	the	work	presented	as	part	of	this	paper,	Ragpicker	(a	plugin	based	malware	crawler)	was	
chosen	 as	 the	 underlying	 malware	 analysis	 tool.	 Ragpicker	 currently	 has	 an	 embedded	 unpacking	 module	
based	on	ClamAV,	which	 is	used	 for	comparison	purposes.	Ragpicker's	analysis	process	chain	starts	with	 the	
crawling	modules,	as	can	be	seen	in	Figure	1.	Here	the	user	can	select	malware	feeds	where	the	malware	will	
be	downloaded	directly	or	an	already	known	website	with	bad	reputation	will	be	parsed	for	malware	binaries.	
Another	option	provided	is	to	download	entire	malware	databases,	such	as	the	onemalwr.com	offers	for	free.	
Numerous	crawling	modules	are	included,	but	are	not	activated	in	the	standard	configuration.	
	
After	 downloading	 the	malware	 using	 the	 crawling	modules,	 they	will	 be	 saved	 in	 a	MongoDB	 (Chodorow,	
2013)	 database	 or	 software	 called	 VxCage	 (Guarnieri,	 2015),	 representing	 a	 file	 based	 malware	 repository	
	
	
usable	 over	 a	 REST	 API.	 Using	 one	 or	 both	 options	 for	 repository	 purposes,	 Ragpicker	 now	 provides	 an	
enrichment	of	 information	for	each	sample	gathered	using	the	available	processing	modules.	These	modules	
provide	basic	 analysis	 such	 as	 calculating	 the	hash	 values,	 identifying	 the	mime-type,	 collecting	 information	
from	 virustotal.com,	 etc.	 One	 of	 this	 processing	modules	 checks	whether	 the	malware	 is	 packed	 using	 the	
pefile/peutils	python	modules	by	Ero	Carrera	(2014).	In	this	function	the	sections	of	the	PE	file	will	be	
analysed.	If	enough	sections	look	like	they	contain	compressed	data	and	the	data	makes	up	for	more	than	20%	
of	 the	 total	 file	 size	 then	 the	 function	 will	 return	 True.	 To	 determine	 that	 there	 must	 be	 compressed	 or	
encrypted	data,	the	function	uses	algorithms	to	calculate	the	entropy	of	the	relevant	sections.	The	threshold	
value	 used	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 section	 is	 packed	 or	 even	 not	 is	 7.4.	 The	 value	 of	 7.4	 is	 empirical	 and	
determined	by	the	community,	based	on	looking	at	a	few	files	packed	by	different	packers.		
	
	
	
Figure	1:		Unpacking	Process	Chain	
	
As	described	by	Zwanger	et	al.	(2014)	entropy	is	not	the	best	indicator	to	detect	a	packed	binary.	High	entropy	
occurs	mostly	 in	two	places,	 in	the	code	section	and	in	the	packed	payload.	Normally	the	code	section	has	a	
smaller	entropy	than	the	packed	payload,	but	that	is	unreliable	as	one	will	find	packed	payloads	can	also	have	
low	entropy.	The	Codescanner	of	the	CodeDB	operates	inverted.	First	of	all,	it	searches	for	sections	and	spaces	
that	 are	 definitely	 not	 entropic	 and	 suppresses	 them	 (Data,	 Strings,	 Null-Blocks,	 etc).	 Then	 only	 encrypted	
payload	or	 the	code	section	remains	and	can	be	observed	with	algorithms	to	detect	 the	packer.	An	abstract	
description	 could	 be	 the	 proof	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 relationship	 of	 40%	exposed	 code	 section,	 10%	data	
section	and	50%	packed	payload.	Every	result	shortening	the	40%	readable	code	section	will	mark	the	sample	
packed.	This	packer	detection	procedure	seems	to	be	more	reliable	than	the	way	peutils.py	does.	
	
3.2	Evaluation	of	Ragpicker's	ClamAV	Unpacking	Module	
	
ClamAV	is	an	open	source	(GPL)	anti-virus	engine	used	in	a	variety	of	situations	including	email	scanning,	web	
scanning,	and	end-point	 security.	 It	provides	 several	utilities	 including	a	 flexible	and	scalable	multi-threaded	
daemon,	 a	 command-line	 scanner	 and	 an	 advanced	 tool	 for	 automatic	 database	 updates.	 Using	 a	 special	
command-line	 option	 ClamAV	 is	 able	 to	 unpack	 different	 but	 already	 known	 packing	 algorithms	 like	 UPX,	
NSPACK,	UPACK,	ASPACK	and	some	more.	To	utilise	 this	 functionality	 flexible	a	python	 function	was	written	
using	 the	 Linux	 command-line	 ClamAV-Tool	 clamscan.	 The	 unpacking	 rate	 of	 the	 clamscan	 binary	 was	
determined	 in	 two	different	ways.	 The	 first	was	 the	 ability	 to	 download	 a	malware	 sample-set	 daily	 in	 one	
package	of	hundred	different	samples	from	the	commercial	provider,	 (MalwareMonster,	2015),	 for	free.	The	
second	way	used	the	Ragpicker	crawler	again	to	put	the	final	solution	to	the	test.	Using	both	methods,	a	static	
set	and	a	dynamic	continuously	loading	malware	stream	was	used	for	evaluation.	The	results	observing	these	
different	 feeds	 are	 presented	 in	 Figure	 2	 and	 3.	 Examples	 of	 utilised	 packers	 unpacked	 with	 ClamAV	 and	
identified	with	the	peid	signature	database	are:	
	
	
	
• UPX	-	www.upx.sourceforge.net	
• UPX	v0.89.6	-	v1.02	/	v1.05	-	v1.22	DLL	
• Safeguard	1.03	-	Simonzh	
• Borland	Delphi	3.0	
	
At	the	time	of	writing,	examples	of	packers	that	cannot	be	unpacked	with	ClamAV	were:	
	
• AHTeam	EP	Protector	0.3	(fake	PCGuard	4.03-4.15)	-	FEUERRADER	
• PECompact	2.0x	Heuristic	Mode	–	Jeremy	Collake	
• NsPack	2.9	-	North	Star	
• Packman	v1.0	-	Brandon	LaCombe	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	2:		Unpacking	Rates	using	ClamAV	
	
	
	
	
Figure	3:		Ragpicker	(using	ClamAV)	Unpacking	Rate	over	10	Week	Testing	Window	
	
	
4.	Implementation	and	Integration	of	Ether	Unpacker	
	
The	 Ether	 system	was	 developed	 in	 2008	 by	 a	 group	 of	 scientists	 (ArtemDinaburg,	 2008)	 and	 is	 a	malware	
analysis	 framework	 which	 leverages	 hardware	 virtualisation	 extensions	 (specifically	 Intel	 VT)	 to	 remain	
transparent	to	malicious	software.	Ether	is	a	generic	malware	analyser	with	the	main	target	of	detecting	anti-
techniques.	 Ether	 is	 transparent	 to	 malware	 and	 capable	 of	 handling	 most	 of	 the	 current	 anti-technique	
mechanisms.	The	limitations	and	threats	that	time	were	tolerable	relative	to	others	presented	solutions.	
	
4.1	Preparation	
	
It	is	necessary	to	install	the	Ether	machine	from	scratch	to	be	able	to	integrate	this	approach	into	the	parallel	
developed	analysis	cascade	and	to	be	able	to	start	the	evaluation	regarding	the	quality	and	performance	of	the	
unpacking	capability.	The	operation	system	Ether	was	built	 for	was	Debian	5	with	a	working	XEN	Hypervisor	
3.1.0	implementation.	The	developers	published	the	whole	source	code	and	a	rudimentary	documentation	so	
that	 everyone	who	 is	 interested	 could	 test	 the	 implied	 capabilities.	 As	 a	 prerequisite,	 the	 server	 hardware	
should	have	the	Intel	VT	chip-set	activated	in	BIOS.	While	reading	through	some	papers	that	discussed	Ether's	
pro	and	cons	there	where	references	to	use	the	AMD	VT-X	chip-set	to	handle	Ether	detection	or	anti-analysing	
functions,	but	for	the	time	working	on	the	paper	there	was	no	hardware	with	an	AMD	chip-set	available.	That	
should	be	taken	into	account	for	the	future	work	when	the	results	of	the	Ether	integration	are	worthwhile.			
	
	
	
Next	to	the	delivered	installation	description	there	were	some	FAQ	and	mailing	list	entries	that	explained	how	
to	avoid	errors	while	 installing	 the	system.	Several	undocumented	traps	have	to	be	circumvented.	To	get	 to	
know	the	main	functionalities	of	Ether	and	how	the	system	deals	with	malware	samples,	a	virtualised	WIN	XP	
SP2	32-bit	guest	has	been	installed	from	scratch,	too.		
	
In	this	first	Ether	testing	phase,	it	was	immediately	clear	that	Ether	is	only	a	prototype	and	not	fully	functional.	
The	standard	installation	is	not	ready	for	the	deployment	as	a	generic	unpacker	for	batch	processing	tasks	that	
consumes	one	malware	sample	after	another.	The	main	focus	lied	on	the	controlled	single-stepping	execution	
of	the	sample	which	shall	be	analysed	in	one	virtual	machine.	The	great	advantage	in	comparison	to	an	agent	
based	implementation	like	the	Cuckoo	Sandbox	(Foundation,	2015)	is	that	the	machine	can	be	monitored	from	
the	outside	without	any	special	manipulation	of	the	guest	that	can	be	detected.	Most	of	the	anti-techniques,	
are	eliminated	that	way.	The	control	of	XEN	that	time	was	not	that	comfortable	like	one	can	enjoy	these	days.	
For	 example,	 the	 very	 useful	 snapshot	 mechanism	 to	 recover	 a	 system	 state	 very	 fast	 does	 not	 exist.	 To	
prepare	the	machine	for	the	purpose	of	this	paper	a	higher	automation	capability	is	needed	than	this	old	XEN	
version	facilitates	out	of	the	box	to	boost	the	analysis	capacity.	
	
4.2	Software	customisations	
	
The	Ether	 source	 code	only	makes	a	prototype	available	where	either	one	 can	 follow	 the	 instructions	of	an	
executed	 binary	 inside	 a	 virtual	machine	 one	 after	 another	 or	 an	 image	 of	 a	 beforehand	 provided	 process	
name	will	be	dumped	to	a	configured	 folder	while	detecting	a	memory	write	attempt.	The	execution	of	 the	
potential	 malicious	 binary	 will	 not	 stop	 automatically.	 This	 prototype	 functionalities	 are	 implemented	
rudimentary	and	show	several	bugs	that	make	the	whole	system	unstable.		
	
To	 control	 the	 XEN	 Hypervisor,	 some	 more	 functionalities	 were	 needed	 and	 have	 been	 configured	 and	
developed	further	on.	Because	the	research	phase	of	the	paper	was	limited	in	time	the	organising	features	and	
costly	 investigated	analysis	 time	slots	were	 implemented	using	bash	scripts.	The	Ether	unpacking	 function	 is	
not	 able	 to	 detect	 the	 end	 of	 the	 unpacking	 process.	 In	 the	 prototype,	 the	 executed	 binary	 stays	 in	 a	 loop	
waiting	 for	 a	manual	break	 though	 the	unpacking	 concluded	yet.	As	 a	matter	of	 fact,	 dealing	with	different	
kind	of	malware	and	the	Ether	unpacking	capabilities,	one	will	find	out	that	it	is	not	possible	to	know	exactly	
when	the	whole	unpacking	process	is	done.	One	will	discover	that	malware	could	have	several	packing	layers	
that	cannot	be	predicted.	Some	research	and	evaluations	were	necessary	to	prepare	expedient	decisions	for	
the	configuration	and	control	of	the	system	in	a	most	effective	way.	After	the	manual	execution	of	different	
kind	of	packed	binaries,	it	made	sense	to	insert	some	interrupts	or	test	loops.	The	above-mentioned	snapshot	
mechanism,	 nowadays	 a	 standardised	 feature	 in	 virtual	 machine	 environments,	 has	 been	 recreated	 to	
optimise	the	automation	capabilities	that	are	needed	for	the	integration	into	the	analysis	cascade	later.	
	
All	 in	 all,	 the	use	of	not	 the	newest	 available	hardware	and	 state-of-the-art	 technologies	 and	especially	 the	
single-stepping	approach	of	Ether	means	a	long	cycle	for	each	malware	sample	that	has	to	be	unpacked.	The	
system	has	been	configured	to	unpack	three	samples	simultaneously	using	three	comparable	virtual	machines.	
One	 can	 state,	 working	 some	 weeks	 with	 that	 special	 configuration,	 the	 average	 analysis	 process	 of	 one	
samples	lasts	around	9	minutes.	The	boot	process	of	each	virtual	machine	was	configured	to	45	seconds,	after	
measuring	the	time	required	not	running	into	errors.	One	will	experience	that	each	booting	process	is	different	
regarding	the	time	it	needs	to	get	ready	for	the	malware	execution,	though	the	virtual	machine	configuration	
is	the	same.	Time	influencing	factors	are	the	CPU	load	of	the	host	system,	the	network	availability	and	so	on.	In	
the	 virtual	machine,	 all	 security	mechanisms	are	deactivated.	 The	 samples	 are	 copied	 to	 the	machine	using	
SCP.	 The	 execution	 of	 the	 samples	 will	 be	 enabled	 per	 SSH	 command.	 When	 a	 memory	 write	 attempt	 is	
triggered	with	the	Ether	hypervisor	 listener	then	the	relevant	process	will	be	dumped	and	saved	outside	the	
machine.	The	scripts	 then	wait	another	30	seconds	to	 lead	all	unpacking	 functions	 finish.	Additionally,	Ether	
tries	to	fix	the	process	memory	dump	to	be	executable	afterwards.	Therefore,	it	guesses	the	missing	sections	
like	the	import	address	table	(IAT).	Working	with	several	samples	over	some	time	showed	that	there	is	often	
more	 than	 one	memory	write	 attempt	 in	 that	 30	 seconds	waiting	 loop.	 For	 every	memory	write	 attempt	 a	
separate	 process	 dump	will	 be	 created	 and	 saved	 on	 the	 systems	 hard-disk.	 The	 Ether	worker	 script	 stops	
automatically	 after	 12	 minutes’	 runtime	 when	 no	 unpacking	 shots	 of	 the	 software	 are	 detected.	 After	 an	
evaluation	round,	one	can	state	that	most	of	the	samples	were	unpacked	in	that	period	of	time.	That	helps	to	
be	resource	effective	regarding	the	duration	of	the	execution	of	each	sample	and	the	unpacking	process.	
	
	
	
In	the	final	configuration,	used	to	solve	the	primary	issue	of	a	low	ClamAV	unpacking	rate,	the	Ether	machine	
was	integrated	listening	permanently	in	one	local	directory	for	samples	handed	over	and	an	output	directory	
where	the	unpacked	samples	can	be	fetched.	If	Ether	is	not	able	to	find	the	OEP	after	12	minutes	a	text-file	is	
created	 that	 informs	 about	 the	 failed	 state.	 The	 continuous	 run	 of	 the	 listener	 was	 ensured	 using	 a	 script	
which	starts	every	minute	controlled	by	a	system	scheduler.			
	
In	case	the	system	crashes	while	analysing	samples	then	after	reboot	the	restart	of	the	listener	automatically	
cleans	up	the	old	aborted	analysis.	More	on	that	system	crashes	will	be	stated	in	the	section	that	describes	the	
first	impressions	using	Ether.			
	
	
5.	Evaluation	of	Ether	Unpacker	Integration	
	
5.1	Assessments	to	the	Runtime	
	
All	101	samples	were	uploaded	to	the	Ether	unpacker.	At	the	time	of	writing,	the	setup	was	configured	to	use	
three	virtual	machines	in	parallel.	In	the	log-files	of	each	sample	unpacking	attempt,	the	analysis	runtime	was	
determined	and	was	 found	 to	be	 in	 the	 range	outlined	 in	Figure	4.	Using	 the	average	 time	of	9	minutes	11	
second,	 an	 estimate	 of	 the	 total	 duration	 for	 unpacking	 all	 samples	 is	 calculable.	 The	 overall	 unpacking	
duration	was	over	5	hours	using	the	Ether	unpacker	in	the	parallel	configuration.	
	
	
	
Figure	4:		Ether	Unpacker	Runtime	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	5:		CodeDB	Thumbnails	Process	Dumps	of	file-20150405-00097.exe	
	
	
5.2	The	Single	Unpacked	Sample	
	
Every	 successful	 unpacking	 attempt	 creates	 a	 container	 file	 containing	 all	 relevant	 process	 dumps,	 an	
unpacking	log	file,	and	the	original	malware	sample.	The	count	of	process	dumps	of	one	unpacked	sample	was	
found	 to	differ	 from	1	 to	493	dumps	 for	 the	set	of	 samples	 tested.	Figure	5	 shows	 that	only	 the	 first	dump	
contains	 visible	 code.	 The	 other	 dumps	 until	 the	 last	 one	 also	 contained	 no	 visible	 code.	 Therefore,	 the	
decision	 was	made	 that	 only	 the	 first	 dump	 shall	 be	 used	 for	 further	 analysis	 steps	 and	 especially	 for	 the	
automatic	onward	transfer	to	the	CodeDB.	
	
5.3	Ether	Unpacking	Summary	
	
	
	
The	results	after	executing	all	101	packed	samples	in	Ether's	virtual	machine	configuration	were	promising.	61	
prosperous	 unpacking	 attempts	 were	 counted.	 These	 results	 mean	 an	 average	 unpacking	 rate	 of	 60.3%.	
Comparing	against	ClamAV's	unpacking	rates	(outlined	in	Figure	2),	Ether	results	in	a	significant	improvement	
in	 the	 unpacking	 rates,	 as	 outlined	 in	 Figure	 6.	 The	 error	 adjusted	 packed	 files	 (APF)	 are	 the	 files	 detected	
packed	by	the	CodeDB	 initially,	 reduced	by	the	successful	ClamAV	unpacking	attempts	and	diminished	again	
removing	any	corrupt	files.	
	
5.4	The	CodeDB	Integration	
	
A	python	script	was	developed	to	extract	the	first	process	dump	of	the	tar-file	and	uploads	it	automatically	to	
the	 CodeDB.	 There,	 once	 again,	 a	 packer	 check	 is	 one	 of	 the	 first	 criteria	 the	 CodeDB	 executes.	 The	 code	
database	 needs	 more	 then	 40%	 code	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 packed	 payload.	 After	 evaluating	 all	 successfully	
unpacked	 samples	 in	 combination	 with	 the	 CodeDB,	 only	 5	 samples	 were	 accepted	 into	 the	 database	
unpacked.	All	other	samples	were	rejected	with	the	status	message	“\packed".	In	general,	this	does	not	mean	
that	 the	 dumps	 do	 not	 contain	 any	 unpacked	 sections	merely	 not	 passing	 the	 required	 40%	 threshold.	 The	
unaccepted	samples	can	still	be	useful	for	other	purposes,	for	example	the	examination	of	the	embedded	and	
now	 in-clear	 text	 strings.	 The	 requirements	 of	 the	 CodeDB	 demand	 more	 quality	 regarding	 the	 achieved	
unpacking	results.	
	
	
	
Figure	6:		Unpacking	Rates	using	the	Ether	Unpacker	
	
6.	Conclusion	and	Future	work	
	
In	 this	 paper,	 the	 results	 from	 the	 integration	 and	 evaluation	 of	 the	 Ether	 generic	 unpacking	 tool	 into	
Ragpicker	were	presented.	Unpacked	binaries	are	necessary	 to	be	able	 to	cluster	 the	analysis	 results	on	 the	
code	 sections	and	 reduce	 the	 crawled	 samples	by	assigning	 them	 to	 code	 families.	 The	work	presented	can	
also	 contribute	 to	answering	 several	 research	questions,	 such	as:	 (i)	Does	 the	quality	of	 the	unpacked	 code	
sections	 match	 the	 requirements?	 (ii)	 Are	 the	 selected	 systems	 able	 to	 overcome	 the	 race	 against	 the	
established	and	continuously	enhanced	anti-techniques?	The	work	presented	as	part	of	this	paper	still	leaves	
significant	room	for	further	research	and	improvement.	Even	though	the	simple	aim	to	enhance	the	unpacking	
rate	was	achieved,	dynamic	malware	analysis	systems	have	much	room	for	improvement.	The	contribution	of	
this	 paper	 can	 assist	 the	 investigators	 in	 forensics	 in	 industrial	 control	 systems	 (Vliet,	 2016)	 or	 in	 forensic	
acquisition	and	analysis	of	VoIP	applications	(Sgaras,	2015)	where	the	packed	and	encrypted	malware	patterns	
are	also	the	challenges	or	even	in	triage	process	for	front-line	forensic	personnel	(Hitchcock	et	al.	2016).			
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